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Abstract
Background: Few studies look at policy making in the health sector in the aftermath of a conflict or crisis and even
fewer specifically focus on Human Resources for Health, which is a critical domain for health sector performance.
The main objective of the article is to shed light on the patterns and drivers of post-conflict policy-making.
In particular, we explore whether the post -conflict period offers increased chances for the opening of ‘windows for
opportunity’ for change and reform and the potential to reset health systems.
Methods: This article uses a comparative policy analysis framework. It is based on qualitative data, collected using
three main tools - stakeholder mapping, key informant interviews and document reviews - in Uganda, Sierra Leone,
Cambodia and Zimbabwe.
Results: We found that HRH challenges were widely shared across the four cases in the post-conflict period but that
the policy trajectories were different – driven by the nature of the conflicts but also the wider context. Our findings
suggest that there is no formula for whether or when a ‘window of opportunity’ will arise which allows health systems
to be reset. Problems are well understood in all four cases but core issues – such as adequate pay, effective distribution
and HRH management – are to a greater or lesser degree unresolved. These problems are not confined to post-conflict
settings, but underlying challenges to addressing them – including fiscal space, political consensus, willingness to
pursue public objectives over private, and personal and institutional capacity to manage technical solutions – are liable
to be even more acute in these settings. The role of the MoH emerged as weaker than expected, while the shift from
donor dependence was clearly not linear and can take a considerable time.
Conclusions: Windows of opportunity for change and reform can occur but are by no means guaranteed by a
crisis – rather they depend on a constellation of leadership, financing, and capacity. Recognition of urgency is certainly
a facilitator but not sufficient alone. Post-conflict environments face particularly severe challenges to evidence-based
policy making and policy implementation, which also constrain their ability to effectively use the windows which are
presented.
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Background
Health worker attraction, retention, distribution and per-
formance are arguably the most critical factors affecting
the performance of a health system [1]. In post-conflict
and post-crisis settings where health systems and health
worker livelihoods have been disrupted, the challenges
facing the establishment of the right working environ-
ment are particularly important, and the contextual dy-
namics around them extremely relevant to understand
and incorporate sensitively into policy measures [2]. Few
studies look at policy making in the health sector in the
aftermath of a conflict or crisis [3, 4] and even fewer
specifically focus on Human Resources for Health (HRH)
[5, 6], making HRH policies in post-conflict settings an
overall under researched topic. Moreover, most of the
existing studies focus on the policies per se [7], rather than
at the policy- making trajectory, which is the core subject
of this study.
In this article, we extend the findings of the literature
on policy making in post-conflict and post-crisis by ana-
lysing across a set of case studies. The main objective of
the article is to shed light on the patterns and drivers of
policy-making post-conflict and post-crisis. In particular,
we explore whether this period offers increased chances
for the opening of ‘windows of opportunity’ for change
and reform and the potential to reset health systems [8].
Given this objective, our main focus is specifically on the
policy processes and the drivers of the policy design, as
well as their content and the outcomes of their imple-
mentation. Although our attention is predominantly on
the policies regarding HRH, our findings also touch ele-
ments concerning the broader health system, its financing
and organization, which are often intertwined. Moreover,
we believe that the analysis of the policy-making trajectory
and drivers for HRH issues offers insights which can
illuminate the general features and specificities of policy-
making processes in post-conflict and post-crisis health
systems.
This article builds on the systematic comparison of
case studies carried out in four countries, under the
ReBUILD research project. ReBUILD is a Department
for International Development (DfID)-funded research
partnership, whose work spanned from 2011 to 2016
and aims to produce a body of relevant research on
health systems in post-conflict settings. Specifically, the
four study settings are Cambodia, (northern) Uganda,
Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. The choice of the four
countries allows us to cover a range of different conflict
or crisis and post-conflict/crisis experiences, which are
further described in the context section below and
which include countries at different stages of distance
from recent conflicts.
It is important to note that, although we often use the
term ‘post-conflict’ for sake of simplicity throughout this
article, our research is carried out in one post-crisis
environment (Zimbabwe). In relation to Uganda, although
we use Uganda and northern Uganda interchangeably, the
main study setting was northern Uganda, the region which
experienced protracted conflict. Additionally, we use the
term ‘policy’ in a very broad sense, including not only offi-
cial policies and strategies on HRH, but also program-
matic changes and initiatives that affected health workers,
which were approved in an alternative form to an official
policy document. These are important as in post-conflict
situations some of the most significant changes may come
from these less formal sources.
We start by presenting a brief background on the con-
flicts and crises in these four settings, followed by our
methods. We then use a health policy analysis frame-
work to examine the HRH challenges which arose post-
conflict and how the policy trajectory in each case
responded to them, along with the actors and factors
which influenced policy change. Finally, we examine
how effective the policies have been in addressing HRH
challenges. All of these feed into a final discussion of
what we can learn about policy opportunities and
constraints in post-conflict settings.
Four country contexts
In northern Uganda, the prolonged and widespread
insurgency lasted 20 years (1986–2006) and displaced
populations across the region [9] while the rest of the
country remained largely peaceful. The conflict has
profoundly affected the economic and social fabric of
the area and had a deeply negative impact for the
broader health system. In terms of HRH, the changes
were stark as the majority of health workers fled to safer
places whereas those who stayed behind were trauma-
tized, struggled to cope with worsened working condi-
tions among other hindrances, and often narrowly
survived death [10]. In 2006, the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) was expelled from the region and peace talks
began. The ceasefire was followed by efforts to resettle
the populations to their home villages. The early post-
conflict period also led to the implementation of various
recovery activities under the Peace Recovery and Devel-
opment Plan (PRDP 2007) and aid donations aimed to
improve the general health service delivery in the af-
fected parts of the northern region [11].
In Sierra Leone, the conflict dates from March 1991
when rebels of the Revolutionary United Front launched
an attack from the east of the country near the border
with Liberia to overthrow the government. The resulting
civil war spanned 11 years, ending in 2002, when new
elections were held. During the war time, it is estimated
that over 50,000 people were killed and 2 million dis-
placed, which amounted to almost half of the population
[12]. The war also devastated the healthcare system. The
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vast majority of the health infrastructure was destroyed,
and health worker attrition rates increased, which
compromised efforts to provide equitable access to
health care in the aftermath of the conflict [13]. A
decade after the war, Sierra Leone still suffers from
the effects of the conflict, and the gains made over
time to strengthen the health sector were subject to
a major setback as a result of the 2014 Ebola out-
break [14].
In Cambodia, the conflict dates back to the US carpet
bombing during the Vietnam War (starting in 1969) and
the imposition of Lon Nol to prevent Cambodian support
for Vietnam. Internal political conflicts led to a military
coup in March 1970 which brought in Vietnamese and
United States involvement. The consequence was a radical
insurgency called the Khmer Rouge, which took over
power in 1975–1978. The Khmer Rouge destroyed all so-
cial and economic infrastructures with the aim of turning
Cambodia into an agrarian society. In the process, about
two million people died from starvation, diseases, execu-
tion and institutional destruction [15]. The Khmer Rouge
was partially overthrown in 1979 by the Vietnamese who
formed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and
helped reconstruct the state institutions based on a social-
ist ideology. However, civil war continued between the
government and the remnants of the Khmer Rouge, until
a peace agreement was reached in 1991. The national
election in 1993 sponsored by UN was held successfully,
but factional fighting broke out again in 1997 [16] and
peace as a realistic description of the situation can only be
dated to early 1999 after the death of the Khmer Rouge
leader Pol Pot. At that time, a process of political and
economic liberalisation of the country took place, and
international aid was critical to support the country’s
reconstruction. Although the end of the conflict is now
almost two decades back, the challenges for the health
system remain stark to this day [17].
Although Zimbabwe experienced conflict during its
war of independence in the 1980s, its more recent his-
tory has been characterized by a period of severe
economic, social and political crisis between 1997 and
2009. The decade-long socio-economic crisis caused the
decline of Zimbabwe’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
leading to constrained capability to finance government
services. Between 2000 and 2009, Zimbabwe’s real GDP
declined by 5.9 % annually.. Cumulatively, output
declined by more than 40 % between 2000 and 2007
[18]. The economy experienced high inflation between
2000 and 2008. By mid-2008, hyper-inflation led to the
demonetisation of the Zimbabwe dollar and the adop-
tion of multiple currencies as official tender in 2009. A
marked decline in living standards and increase in
poverty occurred during this crisis period.
From 2005, the health system experienced sharp
decreases in funding and health spending dropped to
a mere 0.3 % of the entire national budget. This
resulted in the deterioration of health infrastructure,
loss of experienced health professionals, drug short-
ages, increased burden of disease and the attendant
high demand for services [19]. The crisis abated when
a coalition government was formed between the two
major parties, the Zimbabwe African Union Patriotic
Front and the Movement for Democratic Change.
This enabled the provision of financial support for
various government programs by the development
partners [18].
Methods
This study is based on a comparative policy analysis
framework, focusing on the exploration of the HRH
policy-making processes, the policy patterns, the key ele-
ments driving them and the consequences for the policy
implementation. This is used to investigate the propos-
ition that the immediate post-conflict period offers a
‘window of opportunity’ to reset trajectories within the
health system.
Data tools and collection
This article makes use of mostly qualitative data,
collected between 2012 and 2013, in the four countries
using three main tools: a stakeholder mapping (in two of
the countries), and key informant interviews and a
document review in all four contexts (Table 1).
In Uganda and Sierra Leone, a stakeholder mapping
exercise took place, bringing together key stakeholders
at national level (and at regional/sub-national level in
Table 1 Overview of data collection methods by country
Cambodia Uganda Sierra Leone Zimbabwe
Document review √ √ √ √
(reference period for the document search) (1979-present) (1999–2014) (2000–2012) (1997–2012)
(num. of documents retrieved) (59) (59) (76) (76)
Key informant interviews (KII) (n) √ (33) √ (25) √ (23) √ (28)
Stakeholder mapping √ √
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Uganda) to discuss the role of the main actors who had
influenced HRH policy and practice over the different
periods. The meeting was facilitated by the research
team and the participants were asked about their narra-
tives of the HRH policy-making processes and, in par-
ticular, to map all the actors concerned (whether present
or not), for their influence and interest in HRH issues
on a 1–5 scale. The stakeholder meeting was carried out
prior to the rest of the data collection and played an im-
portant role in providing a better understanding of the
overall context in the countries in terms of HRH and
identifying key informants who were then contacted for
the interviews. The exercise was not conducted in
Cambodia and Zimbabwe as the group exercise was con-
sidered unsuitable for this potentially sensitive activity in
these contexts.
In all study settings, a thorough review of the docu-
mentation available was carried out, including both grey
and published literature. The focus was on the HRH
documents, including policies, strategies, reports and
evaluations, as well as general health sector policies use-
ful to provide a detailed background. Documents from
governmental sources (Ministry of Health, as well as
other Ministries and the Office of the President), but
also from development partners, donors and NGOs,
local print media, civil society and academic researchers
were included in the search and review. In some cases,
the document search also comprised secondary data and
databases. The time reference for the document review
varied in each country, but focussed on the periods dur-
ing and post-conflict, where the timeline permitted.
In all countries, a series of key informant interviews
was also carried out. Key informants were selected both
at national and (to a lesser extent) sub-national level and
included representatives of Ministries of Health, and of
the HRH department within them, other Ministries or
public agencies/bodies concerned with the health
workforce (e.g. Health Service Board in Zimbabwe, Health
Service Commissions in Sierra Leone and Uganda), health
professionals associations, development partners, national
and international NGOs, and faith-based organizations
responsible for health service delivery (e.g. Zimbabwe
Association of Church Related Hospitals).
The initial topic guide for the key informant interviews
was the same for use across all of the countries. It was
adapted to each of the contexts and also iteratively
modified to reflect any emerging themes. The topic
guide is summarised in Table 2. It comprised questions
sequenced in chronological order and focusing on the
HRH context before, during and (especially) after the
conflict and the challenges faced in each of those
periods. Secondly, the questions concerned the policy
responses to those challenges, the processes through
which they emerged and the effects they had for health
workers as well as broadly for the health system. Inter-
views were kept semi-structured to allow the respondent
to focus on those issues and policies, as well as time pe-
riods, of which they had more experience and
knowledge.
Data analysis
Data analysis was carried out at country level, separately
for each of the tools adopted. The first, descriptive step
of the analysis consisted in preparing a timeline which
presents, in chronological order, the HRH related pol-
icies, reforms and practices which emerged during the
period considered. Secondly, at a more analytical level,
the qualitative information collected (e.g., documents,
notes from stakeholder mappings and transcriptions of
interviews) was coded either manually or using QSR
NVivo 10 and ATLAS TI Version 7.0. In order to allow
systematic comparison, the same or similar pre-
identified themes were identified and used to code the
information from the different sources and for all coun-
tries (Table 3). These codes are based on the questions
highlighted in the study protocol [2].
In this article, we compare and contrast the experi-
ences, features and issues of the policy-making processes
in each of the countries, using a policy analysis frame-
work [20]. The Walt and Gilson policy triangle was se-
lected as it is a relatively simple framework which
includes all elements which were judged to be relevant
to examine the evolution of HRH policies. Given the
complexity of settings and time periods under consider-
ation, a simple framework was appropriate to structure
our examination of themes. Additionally, the systematic
and deliberate comparison of multiple cases intends to
improve the analytic generalizability of our findings by
providing insights on the possible causal mechanism be-
hind the policy-making patterns, thus allowing the devel-
opment of more general and generalizable conclusions
compared to single case studies [21, 22]. The issues on
which the comparison focused, which are presented in
this paper include (i) the HRH context and the challenges
which emerged, persisted or were aggravated during and
after the conflict/crisis, (ii) the policy content and the
processes and patterns in the introduction and design of
HRH policies, reforms and practices to address those
HRH challenges over time, with a specific attention to the
post-conflict/crisis phase, (iii) the drivers of the policy
change, and (iv) the effectiveness of the policies and of
their translation into practices.
Study limitations
The methodology chosen has the advantage of providing
rich data and information over the long time span which
we aimed to cover in the case studies. In particular, the
combination of methods within each case study allowed
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us to collect sufficient amount of information, in an it-
erative way, despite the general difficulties in gathering
data for a long period of time and in post-conflict con-
texts where data are scarce [23], while the comparison
of case studies allowed us to search for patterns and
consider generalizability. Despite these advantages, the
study has some limitations mostly due to the varying
level of details between country cases. In some contexts,
this was due to the difficulty of retrieving documents or
for interviewees of recalling periods much before the
data collection (e.g. in Sierra Leone). In other cases, this
was due to the reticence of the interviewees, given the
still fragile political situation (e.g. in Zimbabwe). Some
elements of evidence – for example, on financing of
policies – were harder to obtain. Finally, we focussed
less on the probing for the process of policy making in
this study (and more on the actors, factors, context, and
content), although findings on process emerged indir-
ectly from different sources.
Ethics
Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the
relevant national ethical committees in the four coun-
tries, as well as the Liverpool School of Tropical Medi-
cine. Precautions were undertaken to obtain informed
consent, to assure confidentiality of information, anonym-
ity of respondents, to undertake research in a sensitive
manner, and to keep data secure. Research locations were
selected to ensure privacy and all data were anonymised.
Table 2 Summary of key informant interview guide
Examples of questions
1. Context and challenges
• What was the situation of health workers after the conflict?
• What were the main challenges in relation to the workforce, in
particular with reference to recruitment, posting and retention in
rural areas, motivation?
• How did the challenges vary across the post-war period?
2. Policy responses
• Can you explain how the public policies changed over time since
then?
• What were the objectives of the new policies?
• Did the policies build on what went before or not?
3. Drivers of changes
• What were the main factors which influenced the changes in
policy?
• Which factors do you think are most influential in policy change?
(Please explain how and why). Specific people, specific organisations,
funding, political factors, evidence, context changes (economic,
security, political, organisational, international context..)?
• Have these factors changed over the period? If so, describe how,
and why.
• Who were the main actors involved in the process of developing
policies on HRH?
4. Implementation challenges
• Taking each of the major reform initiative in turn, can you describe
to me how they were implemented?
- What were the mechanisms?
- Over what areas of the country?
- Focussed on which health workers?
- Implemented by whom?
• What were the implementation challenges? Were they overcome?
How?
5. Financing & sustainability
• How costly was the policy to implement?
• Who funded it?
• How sustainable do you think it is?
• Is it still on-going? If not, why not?
6. Effects of the policy changes
For each major policy change/intervention described, ask:
• Was it ever evaluated? How and by whom? What were the results?
• What was its overall impact, in your view?
• How did effects differ across regions? Across cadres? Across ethnic
groups? Across genders?
• How do others view the experience? What lessons have they
drawn from it?
• Did it have any unintended effects (positive or negative)?
Table 2 Summary of key informant interview guide (Continued)
More specific probes for impact on: health worker pay, recruitment,
retention, distribution, performance, access to services and the health
system more broadly
7. Your recommendations
• Based on these experiences and what you described to us, which
strategies you think should be adopted to address the current
challenges for health workers?
Table 3 Themes used for coding of the information collected
from the different sources
Themes Subthemes
HRH context
and challenges
Recruitment challenges Changes to these
challenges over time
before, during and
after conflict/crisis
Distribution challenges
Retention challenges
Performance challenges (pay,
motivation, management, etc.)
Policies
adopted
Policy objectives and
approaches
For each of the policy
responses
Drivers of change
Implementation of policies
Financing of policies
Impacts/effectiveness
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Results
Context: challenges for HRH after the conflict
Recruitment
All four countries faced challenges recruiting adequate
numbers of staff after the conflict or crisis, as would be
expected, given that training institutions had been
destroyed and large numbers of staff killed or fled. The
most extreme example was Cambodia, where at the end
of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, only 25 of the 450
medical doctors from before 1975 survived and remained
in the country; and 26 pharmacists, 28 dentists, and 728
of the 3,400 medical students returned in 1979 [14]. This
HRH crisis required immediate production of health pro-
fessionals to reconstruct the health system. Similarly, in
Sierra Leone and northern Uganda, the conflict depleted
the number of health workers and exacerbated the main
HRH challenges faced before the war. In Sierra Leone, in
particular, health workers were targeted for abduction
during the conflict to provide health services behind
enemy lines [13] and many did not survive the conflict. In
both countries, attrition rates for health workers also
increased during this period, as many fled to safety with
poor retention rates after the conflict, due to better eco-
nomic situations elsewhere [8, 10]. In contrast, in
Zimbabwe, given the different nature of the crisis, the
challenge was more about retaining existing staff than
recruiting new ones.
In addition, across all post-conflict countries, the
production of health workers remained a challenge, as
the in-country medical training institutions were not
producing enough health workers to fill the gap created
in the aftermath of the conflict. This compounded the
problem of inadequate health workforce across all the
cadres, though more pronounced for the higher cadres
where starting numbers were lower. For example, only
67 medical officers were present in Sierra Leone in 2005
compared to 203 in 1993. The same pattern was seen
for State Registered Nurses, of which only 152 of the
623 recorded in 1993 remained in 2005 [8].
Finally, recruitment challenges were made starker by
a history of low, irregular remuneration for health
professionals, which spans pre- and post-conflict. Many
Zimbabwean staff migrated to the diaspora, while
others simply absconded because there was no point in
working due to inflation which rendered salaries worth-
less [24]. Structural factors, such as the recruitment
ban and weak functionality of district service commis-
sions were also identified as causes in Uganda [25].
Distribution
Across the four settings, distribution of staff was a major
challenge – one which had pre-dated the conflict or
crisis, but was worsened by it. In Uganda, for example,
the Acholi sub-region in the north of the country had a
poor HRH status compared to other regions, with the
majority of districts in Acholi being below nationally-
defined staffing norms [11]. Key informant interviews
also highlighted the challenges of poor staff mix, unbal-
anced gender mix and absence of key health staff re-
quired at various levels of health facilities [25]. The
situation was worsened by the absorption of clinical staff
into administrative roles, as one of the key informants in
Uganda recounted:
“We [now] have one doctor who is the DHO [district
health officer] … of course he is an administrator…
Other cadres like nursing officers, midwives are still
lacking. We have [only] filled around 46 % of the
staff [required] … Such is the dilemma we are in.”
(KII - Amuru, Uganda)
In Sierra Leone, health workers that remained after
the conflict preferred to work in the district headquarter
towns, leaving rural areas grossly understaffed [26].
Similarly, prior to 1995, the challenge facing the Minis-
try of Health (MoH) in Cambodia was not only to
quickly produce health workers, but also to ensure their
equitable distribution from Phnom Penh and its sur-
rounding provinces to other secured districts as well as
to address the unbalanced distribution of health facilities
[17]. Zimbabwe presented a slightly more complex pic-
ture – while the loss of health workers affected the rural
areas disproportionally, especially in terms of higher
level staff, interviews pointed to the fact that some staff
preferred to be posted to rural areas during the crisis in
order to reduce living costs [27].
Retention
Pre-existing challenges relating to the retention of health
workers continued and were aggravated in the aftermath
of the conflict in some settings. Low and irregular pay-
ments, lack of promotion and clear career progression,
unavailability of suitable accommodation and generally
poor working conditions, all contributed to retention
challenges in the public sector in Uganda, for example.
In particular, the low-level and delayed payments were
found to be caused by financial limitations and wage bill
ceilings [11] – a finding across all four settings and in
common with many other low income countries.
Low financial remuneration for health cadres meant that
working for NGOs tended to be far more attractive to
health workers than working in government health facil-
ities, due to the better financial incentive and training envir-
onment, as reported in the three post-conflict countries.
“It was horrible. The health personnel had migrated
outside or were working for NGOs. There were critical
shortages.” (KII– MoH, Sierra Leone)
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With the end of conflict, the departure of NGOs led
to the inability to sustain staff whose salaries were previ-
ously paid by NGOs. In northern Uganda, this meant
that many health workers moved to neighbouring South
Sudan, which was then (at the time of data collection)
experiencing a post-conflict aid boom and thus attracted
NGOs paying better salaries and providing better work-
ing conditions.
“The majority of our staff are going to South Sudan
because these days there are few NGOs but in Sudan,
they are better paid than in Uganda.” (KII - Kitgum,
Uganda)
These HRH movement patterns highlight the inter-
connection of health labour forces within the region.
Another pattern can be found in the movement between
sectors. In Uganda, there is a reported increase in move-
ment of health workers from private non-for-profit sec-
tor (PNFP) to public sector in the post-conflict period,
mainly due to health workers’ experiences of the PNFP
(largely mission) sector, better pay in the public sector
and other retirement-related incentives [28]. Similarly, in
Zimbabwe, the economic crisis has generated inter-
sectoral movements of staff, with staff seeking employ-
ment by municipalities, which are able to offer more
attractive incentives while regular salaries lost much of
their value in the crisis. This has led to perverse out-
comes, with more experienced staff at lower level facil-
ities which are able to offer better overall pay [24].
In Cambodia, retention did not emerge as a major
challenge in the initial post-conflict phase, at least for
the secure areas of the country. Despite poor road con-
ditions and a lack of infrastructure, health workers were
reportedly more than willing to stay and work in their
assigned posts. Getting government employment status,
social recognition and a sense of helping people were
cited as motivating factors to remain working. In addition,
before the mid-1990s, there was little difference in living
conditions between urban and rural areas, and the local
recruitment system worked well particularly when people
were posted to their home areas [17]. Shortages of well-
trained health workers prior to 1993 meant that doctors
and other well-trained cadres were often placed in the
provincial towns, rather than working in rural areas. After
the national election in 1993, health managers reported
greater challenges in posting and retaining health workers
in rural areas. Insecurity was then replaced by a more
complicated set of issues for retention, including social
and economic opportunities for staff. For example, the
growing private sector offered dual practice opportunities
in urban areas. Additionally, the influx of external actors
to support the reconstruction and development of the
health sector led to a brain drain from public to NGO
sector or development programmes. Since 2002, however,
turnover has been relatively low in the public health sec-
tor, according to official records. Staff attrition is esti-
mated at around 1-2 % per year across the entire
workforce and around 4 % for primary nurses in the pub-
lic health sector.
Performance
Workload The difficulty of re-staffing the sector and
retaining staff had knock-on effects on workload in all
settings, though in some, like Cambodia, this has been
less marked because of low demand and access to health
services, at least in the initial post-conflict period. Health
workers in northern Uganda lamented that, with the
closure of the refugee/IDP camps and the return of the
population to their villages, the workload increased be-
cause of the difficulties in mobilizing and reaching pa-
tients within a larger catchment area,
“… [In] camps … everybody would conveniently come
for treatment but now everybody has gone back to
their villages some distance away and so health
workers have to commute to those places, which is
really challenging.” (KII - Kitgum, Uganda)
Motivation Across the countries, health workers re-
ported low motivation due to low salary levels, lack of
career progression, delayed salaries (in some cases such as
Uganda, caused by un-updated payroll), and insufficient or
absent accommodation for staff at health facilities [13, 25].
Some aspects, such as housing, have received investment
in post-conflict recovery plans, whereas others, like career
progression and difficult working conditions, persist. Our
analysis also revealed that the issue of low pay levels was
not cited as a challenge in the immediate post-conflict
period, although remuneration increased in importance
for many staff over time as systems were re-established
and expectations grew. In Zimbabwe, however, given that
the crisis was dominated by an economic collapse, pay was
the core issue - the most conspicuous change that oc-
curred was the marked decline in the standard of living.
Depressed salaries and dissatisfaction with working condi-
tions became widespread and from 2004, the vast majority
of health workers were beginning to do extramural eco-
nomic activities to be able to sustain themselves. In
particular, the practice of selling a variety of wares at the
workplace was very prevalent during the crisis in all the
districts and healthcare sectors studied [27].
HRH coordination In the immediate post-conflict
period in Sierra Leone, it was reported that a number of
different actors were involved in the health system re-
construction. However a lack of coordination between
these actors, described as chaotic, lead to a fragmented
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approach to reconstruction, which posed a huge chal-
lenge for the MOHS to establish control over the health
workforce [29].
“After the war, it was complete chaos. The NGOs
came and went […]. They employed the nurses
directly, without even consulting the Ministry. […]
They never presented any budget. But this was a
war. We had to bend backwards in the Ministry”
(SM – MoH, Sierra Leone).
The pattern does vary by country however. In Cambodia,
this proliferation of players was also found, though not
immediately post-conflict, while in Zimbabwe, given the
strained relationships at national level, the influx of aid
players was more limited. In Uganda, given the protracted
nature of the conflict, NGOs and donors were present and
supporting work in northern Uganda from the crisis
period; the post-crisis period has seen the continued pres-
ence of some with some degree of withdrawal now too.
Content: policy responses
Uganda
While sharing many of the challenges of the other set-
tings, Uganda’s policy responses show a specific pattern,
which in large part reflects the fact that in this case
study, conflict had affected only one region of the coun-
try. The rest of Uganda had a settled policy-making
system, which continued to provide overall guidance,
with limited recognition of the need for specific regional
responses or, initially, specific planning for HRH as a
sub-sector (Fig. 1). From 1999 to 2005, there were no
policies on HRH, rather HRH issues and challenges were
merely indicated as sub-sections of broader nationwide
health policies. Generally, responses to HRH challenges
were nationwide, with no particular focus on conflict-
affected areas in Uganda [11, 25].
In late 2005, the second Health Sector Strategic Plan
(HSSP II 2005/6-2009/10) included for the first time the
recognition of conflict as a factor influencing the health
sector and human resources (Namakula et al. 2014). The
following year, the Human Resources for Health Policy
(2006) and the HRH Strategic Plan were developed to
propose policies to address the identified challenges.
This included a motivation and retention strategy, as
well as a hard-to-reach policy (2010) with the aim of en-
suring the retention of health workers in hard-to-reach
areas, and particularly those affected by the conflict [11].
These documents were prepared in the context of a gen-
eral drive to introduce specific policy responses and in-
terventions in post-conflict northern Uganda. In terms
of HRH, other strategies in place focused on improving
recruitment, working conditions, retention of health
staff, particularly midwives and medical officers, as well
as addressing their training needs. All of these policy re-
sponses were implemented under an overarching frame-
work called the Peace Recovery and Development Plan
(PRDP 2007). With the exception of a few district-led
initiatives, the majority of these initiatives were donor-
funded [11, 25]. In contrast, national initiatives have
been discussed but rarely granted sufficient resources to
guarantee implementation. Moreover, periodic recruit-
ment bans were introduced which hindered health worker
recruitment in the public sector. As a consequence, most
initiatives on the ground to improve staffing, such as
scholarships and support to in-service training, remained
tied to donor-funded projects [11].
Sierra Leone
The development of HRH policy making in post-conflict
Sierra Leone is presented in Fig. 2 (see also [8]).
The first phase, in the immediate post-conflict period
(i.e. 2002–9), consisted mostly in what one of the key
informants referred to as ‘fire-fighting’. This phase was
characterized by the presence of different actors involved
in the health system reconstruction. However, a lack of
coordination between these actors led to a fragmented
approach to reconstruction.
Fig. 1 Evolution of HRH policy responses in post-conflict Northern Uganda
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“People started working on their own areas and they
started developing a policy and plan and things like
that […]. But it was all happening in parallel, also
depending […] on the focus of donors to provide TA
[technical assistance] and funding for certain things.
So I think a lot of policies applied at the beginning
were definitely donor-driven. WHO said ‘you don’t
have a policy on this and this. We have to develop it’,
and you’ll get it.” (KII – NGO, Sierra Leone).
The catalyst for change or the ‘window of opportunity’
for effective HRH reform was the launch of the Free
Health Care Initiative (FHCI), which was announced in
2009 [30] in response to poor maternal and child mortal-
ity rates. A series of reforms was introduced to effectively
operationalize the FHCI, and HRH issues took a key place
among these. These included a significant salary uplift for
technical health workers, fast-track recruitment of health
workers at district level, updating the payroll to reflect
those already volunteering in the facilities, and a Staff
Sanction Framework to monitor absenteeism and protect
the investment of the FHCI in 2010. In 2011 and 2012, a
Performance Based Financing (PBF) scheme and a Remote
Area Allowance were introduced to provide motivation
for primary care workers and remote staff. However, by
2012, the reforming momentum that drove the design of
these reforms was lost, and their implementation lagged
behind and faced numerous challenges [30, 31], entering a
new phase of slow paced policy-making. In this phase, the
new HRH Policy and HRH Strategic Plan (2012) were
prepared, giving ex-post shape to the changes that had
already taken place at operational level [8].
The 2014 Ebola outbreak led to a collapse in the already
fragile health system, with disastrous consequences for
communities and staff. After a delayed response, emer-
gency measures were implemented, including support and
risk allowances for health workers in 2015. As control of
the outbreak improved and the country moved to the
post-Ebola health system strengthening phase, there is
renewed interest in HRH. The Technical Working Group
initially created during the preparation of the FHCI has
been revived in 2015 and charged with the coordination
and implementation of HRH strategies and activities. Ini-
tially, these included another payroll clean and a revision
of the 2012 HRH policies and strategies [31].
Zimbabwe
Figure 3 shows the main phases of HRH reforms before,
during and after the crisis in Zimbabwe. After independ-
ence in 1980, in the period which predated the crisis, the
main focus for the health sector in Zimbabwe had been
on extending coverage of services. In the 1990s, in terms
of HRH reforms, three key policies were introduced: (i)
the job evaluation exercise (1992), (ii) the adoption of the
performance appraisal system (1996), and (iii) the unifica-
tion of the various sectors by government (1997) to ensure
Fig. 2 Evolution of HRH policies in post-conflict Sierra Leone
Fig. 3 Evolution of HRH policies in pre- and post-crisis Zimbabwe
Witter et al. Conflict and Health  (2016) 10:31 Page 9 of 18
better coordination [24]. The job evaluation exercise had
initially found that salaries for those working in the public
health sector were low compared to personnel in state en-
terprises and private sector, and the government accepted
in principle to progressively increase salaries of HRH over
a three year period. This decision, however, was never im-
plemented. In 1996, a public service-wide performance
management appraisal system was introduced to ensure
that high performers were rewarded accordingly and
hence would be retained. However, the implementation of
the scheme was poor because of low capacity to manage
the system and lack of transparency, so that the system
was turned into a mechanism for settling scores, as well as
because of lack of funds to support the salary awards. Fi-
nally, the 1997 takeover of management of health staff in
the PNFP (largely faith-based) sector by the government
was meant to achieve greater equity in service delivery
as well as to ensure uniform HRH terms and condi-
tions. However, the reform did not work fully, as
service contracts between government and mission
providers were not implemented in some provinces
[24, 27].
The crisis started in 2002. During this period, policy-
making concerning HRH continued with key reforms
such as the promulgation of the Health Service Act
(2004), which paved the way for the formation of the
Health Service Board (HSB), in an effort to better
respond to HRH pay and management needs. In 2005, a
performance appraisal and management system, called
Results Based Management, was adopted. In 2007,
several reforms were adopted, including hospital boards
(tasked with the recruitment of selected health worker
grades), duty free importation of vehicles for certain
health worker grades and a targeted incentive scheme in
the 24 poorest districts. However, as in the previous
period, all these reforms had limited support, funding
and implementation [27].
The situation changed in the post-crisis period. At that
time, initiatives which were introduced to address the
on-going HRH challenges, such as the harmonised HRH
retention allowance (2009), a Results Based Financing
(RBF) scheme (2011), and the Health Transition Fund
(HTF) in 2012, enjoyed the support of the pooled donor
funding which was created following the re-establishment
of the relationships with donors. They were more actively
and effectively implemented compared to the policies in
the previous periods.
Cambodia
Cambodia, with its longer post-conflict time-span, has
gone through a number of main phases of HRH policy
evolution (Fig. 4). During the initial reconstruction
phase (1979 to 1989), the focus was on rapidly increas-
ing production of staff, given the very low starting num-
bers. This was attempted by restoring the training
facilities at national, regional and provincial levels [6].
However, the quality of health workers trained varied be-
cause of uncoordinated and outmoded training curricula
and lack of expert trainers. Additionally, with a view to
cascading skills, students were selected by the provincial
health departments (PHDs) and then were deployed to
their districts and/or commune of origin. The health
mangers recalled that:
“[…] we used a slogan: ‘the one with more knowledge
trained the one with no knowledge’. Regardless of
quality of trainings we have, but this way of knowledge
transfer at least worked well to have one or two few
trained staffs at the commune clinic or health post
at that time.” (KII – Manager, Cambodia).
During a second policy-making phase, between 1990
and 1995, after the first national elections of 1993,
Cambodia began to receive an influx of official develop-
ment assistance to rebuild, including the health sector.
This led to an increased presence of international NGOs,
which grew from 23 in 1988 to 164 in the mid-1990s [16].
The MoH, with technical support from WHO, developed
health policies, plans and institutional mechanisms to
coordinate external assistance [32]. However, it was con-
strained by limited managerial capacity, shortages of
health workers and low levels of government funding.
Meanwhile, the conflict between government and rem-
nants of the Khmer Rouge continued until 1997 and many
Fig. 4 Evolution of HRH policies in post-conflict Cambodia
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districts could not be accessed. Coverage and functionality
of facilities in those districts remained extremely low. In
this period, the MoH maintained the focus on strengthen-
ing training institutions. Key informants reported that the
emphasis was still on boosting numbers and filling gaps,
and that quality remained low [17].
In the next half decade (1996–1999), a number of
health management innovations were introduced, in-
cluding the first Health Coverage Plan (HCP) in 1995,
the Health Financing Charter (HFC) in 1996, and the
introduction of health operational districts (ODs) in
1997. Most of these were not focussed on HRH as such
but had major implications for health staff. For example,
in 1996, the government endorsed the collection of user
fees at public facilities in order to reduce under-the-
table charges and increase utilisation [33]. The HFC
aimed to strengthen the professional code of conduct of
health staff and increase revenue for public facilities,
which was then redistributed among the health workers.
In 1998, the government allowed international NGOs to
pilot a number of financial incentives schemes, including
Community-Based-Health Insurance (CBHI) in 1998
and contracting in and out of health management at the
OD level. All of these changed the working conditions
and incentives for staff. The government had taken ad-
vantage of the NGO managed schemes to deploy key
health professionals in rural areas. With regard to HRH
production, the secondary midwife course ended in 1996
with no training of new (primary and secondary) mid-
wives until 2003. This was in response to the change in
focus, mostly driven by development partners, from
quantity to quality of human resources development. At
the same time, the MoH rationalised 59 categories of
health workers into 29 equivalents [6], and pre-service
education for physician assistants was terminated.
In the final phase documented, from 2000 to the
present, the government has been learning from the previ-
ous periods of experimentation to scale up initiatives
which were positively assessed, with the aim of increasing
coverage but also national ownership. In the first HSP
(2003–2007), human resource development objectives in-
cluded increasing the number of midwives through basic
training and strengthening the skills of midwives already
trained through continuing education; addressing the mal-
distribution of key health personnel and improving the
retention of well-trained health workers, especially in rural
areas. The second HSP (2008–2015), which was accom-
panied by a health workforce development plan, focused
on aligning human resource planning and personal
management with heath sector planning, developing and
implementing HRH management policies to deploy staff
in underserved areas through contracts, and increasing
the number of midwives placed and retained in public
sector facilities through effective financial incentives.
These measures included reform of civil service remu-
neration, under which base pay increased by 10 % in
2007/8 and then 20 % per year for the next few years
(World Bank, 2013). Alongside this, an array of salary
supplementations were introduced or continued, includ-
ing from user fees, the health equity funds (introduced
in 2000), service delivery grants, contracting (operating
in various forms since 1999), special operation agency
(SOA) funds (a form of internal public sector contract-
ing, starting in 2003), and community based health
insurance (CBHI). In addition, in 2008, a government
midwife incentive scheme (GMIS) was introduced, pay-
ing between USD 10 in urban areas and USD 15 in rural
areas for every live birth, alongside vouchers to cover
demand-side costs (transport and food allowance for the
poor) from 2010. These reforms focused on boosting the
level of resources available, effective management and
incentives to improve staff commitment to increase the
quantity and quality of service delivery. Among these fi-
nancial innovations, the demand-side schemes (CBHI,
vouchers, HEF) are still managed and implemented by
the international NGOs. Only the user fee formalisation
and GMIS are operating on a nationwide scale, though
other programmes are being scaled up gradually. There
is a plan to develop social health insurance out of the
CBHI experiences, but this is not yet agreed [34].
Actors and factors: drivers of change
Our interviews and document review explored the actors
and factors behind the changes observed in HRH
policies. The themes which emerged included the role of
the development partners, economic factors, political
changes (at home and internationally) and the role of
evidence and advocacy. We look here for patterns across
the different contexts.
The role of the development partners
It is not surprising that in these fragile and post-conflict
settings, development partners were found to play an
important role, though there is considerable variation
across different phases and places and in the kinds of
roles played.
In Uganda, where a stable polity had continued in the
south during conflict in the north, the development part-
ners’ role seems to have mainly been exerted through
funding of different elements of the reconstruction plan
and supporting NGO-led projects, rather than technical
assistance to national policies and plans. The end of the
conflict enabled the government to regain a lead coordin-
ation role over other actors:
“I think there is more order now that the conflict has
ended, I think the government is going to become
much more influential and I think already planned
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initiatives are going to be implemented according to
plan, rather than people just coming in to address
an emergency in which case they could justify any
thing. They could justify their presence in so many
ways because people are dying, children are sick
and everyone is running around looking for a
solution. So I think post-conflict there is much
more systematic way of implementing things.”
(KII - Kampala, Uganda)
However, the availability of funding remains a key fac-
tor in policies and programmes being implemented, ra-
ther than remaining on paper only.
“[…] you can approve but if there is no money then
you can’t do anything. They can say ‘okay the policy is
good but we can’t implement it this year because there
is no money to include in the budget’; then there is
nothing you can do.” (KII- Kampala, Uganda)
The recession led to a remarkable reduction in donor
funding, particularly for the PNFP sector which relied
on this for e.g. the payment of staff salaries in Uganda.
“The hospital has really faced a lot of challenges
because of the economic changes which are happening.
So in a way, last year, so many donors withdrew and
the hospital budget was greatly affected. It was so
difficult for the hospital to maintain the number of
staff which led to reduction in their number. There
was restructuring.”(KII – Kitgum, Uganda)
In Zimbabwe, the economic crisis led to development
partners taking a lead role in sustaining the health work-
force, at least for a period, though there is less evidence
of a role in influencing policies, presumably partly be-
cause of the higher capacity of the Zimbabwe system
prior to collapse as well as the tenser government/donor
relationship.
“Normally Global Fund does not support salaries in
any way so it was a special request by the Ministry
to Global Fund or even to the HTF [pooled donor
funding] now that they support so that if people
deliver, their salaries will be provided for and they
agreed in the hope that the government will improve
salaries and they are hoping they will be able to
support its workers” (KII - National, Zimbabwe)
“… during the crisis particularly in 2007 when the health
sector was almost collapsing these development partners
influenced government to adopt policies that sustained
HRH supply in some of the most disadvantaged provinces
and districts. Government allowed health workers to be
paid directly by development partners in foreign
currency in selected districts” (KII - Development
partner, Zimbabwe)
From 2000, international development partners and
bilateral and multi-lateral players lost confidence in the
government and gradually began to reduce financial sup-
port to the health sector. Instead of direct support to
government, donors opted to channel financial support
through implementing partners and other pooled funding
mechanisms. An example was the Vital Health Services
Support Programme, funded by the European Union and
the Global Fund, which was instituted in September 2007
in three districts in each of the eight provinces that paid
incentives through the district health fund.
The political settlement in 2009 brought with it a
sense of economic stability and international cooper-
ation. The coalition government facilitated cordial rela-
tions with development partners which saw the injection
of funding towards re-attracting health workers to health
facilities in rural areas. Key informants noted that the
introduction of the donor-supported harmonised reten-
tion allowance in March 2009 marked the beginning of a
process to improve the distribution of health workers.
The normalisation of staffing levels was a major achieve-
ment of the coalition government which happened against
the back-drop of improved funding streams from the
international donor community. However, key informants
noted that donors continued to mistrust government. The
harmonised retention fund was being managed by Crown
Agents, for example, and participants said this was done
to improve accountability.
In Cambodia and Sierra Leone, development partners
appear to have had more influence through technical as-
sistance as well as financing. Many of the HRH policy
documents were produced by and to some extent for
international agencies in the first post-conflict period in
Sierra Leone, while in Cambodia, some important shifts,
for example, from quantity of HRH production to qual-
ity in the 1990s were reported to be driven by develop-
ment partners.
The expectation of a period of intense dependence on
development partners post-conflict, followed by a smooth
transition to government leadership, is not supported by
all case studies. In Cambodia, for example, development
partners have been very influential over policies and pro-
grammes for a long period, with dependence if anything
intensifying in later phases as multiple innovations were
developed, piloted and evaluated by a combination of
external funders and NGOs. In Cambodia, in the 1990s,
the priorities of capacity building, HRH development and
management were pulled into different directions by con-
flicting agendas of multilateral and international agencies
and lack of coordination. This situation led to overlapping
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interventions and did not help strengthening government
stewardship and ownership of health sector development
in the post-conflict period. However, by the 2000s, a
more coordinated approach from both donor and gov-
ernment side emerged, including through a sector-wide
approach [17].
In Cambodia, as in other settings, formal procedure
may be relatively less important in decision-making pro-
cesses compared to behind-the-scene negotiations [35].
MoH staff with good technical knowledge holding
powerful positions provide an asset for developing
policies and strategies because they are required to
deal with donors and technical assistant expatriates.
However, the donors are influential in shaping policy
making and priority actions because of the significant
amount of funds they had for health sector. Among
those donors, WHO has played a leading role in pro-
viding technical support to the MoH for policy for-
mulation since 1993 [6].
In Sierra Leone, the periodic crises linked to conflict
and Ebola have led to a cycle of higher cooperation and
dependence on external organisations. In the post-
conflict phase, challenges were reported for the govern-
ment to assert effective leadership in the health sector
and for HRH [8, 36]. In Zimbabwe, the unresolved polit-
ical and economic issues perpetuate the importance of
development partner contributions to maintaining staff,
even as donors are excluded from influence in other
respects [27].
Implementation partners and NGOs
While development partners seem to have played a key
role in defining policy making at central level, at local
level NGOs and non-public actors were critical to shape
the implementation of policies and practices, and in
many cases ensure service provision.
In Uganda, although the government remained the
lead provider of health services, during the conflict
period NGOs and PNFPs took an increased role. After
the conflict, many of the NGOs closed the projects or
scaled down their operations in northern Uganda,
leaving the local and national government to assume a
lead role as before the onset of the conflict. This early
departure may be due to the long-term nature of the
conflict in northern Uganda (which meant a presence
in the districts during the conflict by NGOs). In
Cambodia, by contrast, the role of NGOs as imple-
menting agencies grew over the post-conflict period,
spurred on by the total destruction of the health
system during the war, the initial fragmentation and
dependence of the government on external support
and a consequent openness to innovation. In Sierra
Leone too, NGOs entered post-conflict and have
retained an important operational role, not least
because trust in public finance systems remains weak.
In the post-Ebola period and post-conflict, donors pre-
fer to channel a part of their funding through NGOs.
Analysis of health worker incentives at district level
found that NGOs played an important role by influen-
cing pay and activities through the material and other
support provided for different programmes [37].
Political leadership
Although external actors have played a key role in defin-
ing policy-making patterns in post-conflict environ-
ments, political leadership can also be, in some contexts,
a critical factor. In Sierra Leone, for example, political
leadership was central for the development and sustain-
ing of the FHCI [30, 31]. As with most major policy
developments, a constellation of factors was identified
which supported this move, including the influence of
the international context (favourable to removal of user
fees at that time and promoting the MDGs) and the sup-
port of external players like the British Government and
other donors. In addition, the context of poor maternal
and child health indicators and evidence of the role of fi-
nancial barriers in preventing access were important
underlying factors.
“It was a presidential initiative and so people
were interested, that’s one. Number two, there’s
been a cry for attention towards maternal and
child mortality and for many, many years Sierra
Leone was last in the human development index”
(KII - MoH, Sierra Leone).
Ministry of Health
The influence of the Ministry of Health over HRH
policy-making does not emerge clearly from inter-
views, which is surprising but may reflect a combin-
ation of institutional weakness post-conflict with the
twin pressures of strong donor influence and political
centralisation.
In Cambodia, the drive to regain control and ownership
over HRH and management processes by the Ministry of
Health as distance in time from conflict is reached is evi-
dent in a number of different areas, but best illustrated by
the story of contracting. In 2009, the government adopted
a contracting-in model called SOAs, which built on les-
sons from previous models - ‘contacting-in and out’ of
health management in five ODs in 1999 – 2003, and
hybrid contracting piloted in 11 ODs between 2003 and
2008. While these earlier models had been evaluated as
successful in some respects, they were seen as costly
and too dependent on external actors. The MoH’s
efforts to bring control back into the public sphere led
to the SOA model, based on performance contracts
within the public sector.
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Other public actors
HRH policies can clearly impact on other sectors and
the public purse, making collaboration with Ministries of
Finance and other public bodies important to the mak-
ing and implementing of policies. In Zimbabwe, for ex-
ample, many of the policies introduced to allow for
improvements to HRH terms and conditions (in order
to improve retention during difficult times) were stymied
by an unwillingness to allow the health sector to be dif-
ferent from other civil service sectors.
“The government service is not divisible and no single
department or ministry can decide to be treated
differently; if you study the public service regulations
that is made very clear so the health service will
always be part of the civil service and the PSC will
monitor the MOHCW” (KII – manager, Zimbabwe).
Political and economic changes
The end of conflict and the establishment of a stable
government are generally prerequisites for policy making
and smooth policy implementation. In Zimbabwe, after
a period of political chaos, the formation of the new co-
alition government as a result of the Global Political
Agreement brokered by the Southern African Develop-
ment Community on 15 September 2008 brought about
a semblance of normalcy and this began to restore confi-
dence in the health sector.
“The unity government changed a lot of things and
cadres in the health sector began to feel confident and
the introduction of the United States dollar improved
the economic condition of health workers. As you know
most of the health workers were in the country doing
whatever could sustain them. The worst thing that
happened during the crisis is that cadres could not
access their salaries so no one could blame them for
not coming to work because in reality these cadres
were working for nothing” (KII -manager, Zimbabwe).
Clearly the economic situation in Zimbabwe was not
only a key driver of the crisis but also shaped the policy
responses to it, including the unwillingness and inability
to adequately fund the sector, and hence the dependence
on development partners, noted above. The macro-
economic situation in Zimbabwe deteriorated at an unpre-
cedented rate and to severe levels between 2007 and 2008.
During this economic meltdown a sharp increase in health
worker migration from the country occurred. The exodus
reached a level where the public health sector, according
to one key informant, “became so dislocated that it was
difficult to refer to it as a health service at all in some
areas of the country” [27]. Economic trends also affected
income-generation at lower levels (e.g. in municipalities)
which directly influenced the package of incentives which
could be offered to health staff.
International politics are also a major driver of policy
change, which affects all areas including HRH. For ex-
ample, Cambodia was subjected to international sanctions
until 1991 and had to rely in that period on humanitarian
assistance from some socialist countries and a few inter-
national NGOs [15]. Following the UN-sponsored na-
tional election in 1993, the influx of external development
agencies and funds could begin.
Evidence
The role of evidence in driving HRH policy making must
also be considered and there were examples of evidence
feeding back into policy in all four countries. However, it
is not always clear the extent to which evidence drives
policy or is used to support already-made decisions.
“The Presidential Review Commission of 1999 led
to the formulation of important policy agendas; the
HSB was born out of the findings of the commission.
[…] Assessments and situational analyses have led
to changes in policy indicating that evidence can
sometimes be a factor in policy change. The 2008
HRH situational analysis informed the formulation
of the harmonised retention allowance policy.”
(KII - manager, Zimbabwe)
“Before [the FHCI] we actually did a survey together
with [another NGO] and our finding was that money
was a barrier for women and children to access the
health service delivery. So we started a case to the
government, together with other INGOs, for user fees
to be removed for the care of women and children.”
(KII - NGO, Sierra Leone)
The country which has benefited from the most in-
tense operational research is Cambodia, where changes
in policy seem at least in part derived from evidence
feedback loops, maybe because of the more operational
presence of NGOs and long term engagement by devel-
opment partners.
Advocacy
Advocacy carried out by groups and institutions (e.g.
workers unions, parliamentary committees, NGOs)
working in the health sector emerged as a driver of
change in health policy in Uganda. The policy on hard
to reach allowances for health workers working in re-
mote districts was one such policy for which workers
unions had campaigned. The role of effective local
lobby groups may be a marker of a settled polity, which
may explain why this factor was only mentioned in the
Ugandan interviews.
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“What we have been having is that the parliament
has lately been involved in these issues […]. The
parliament is more defined in terms of research,
budget and more technical people and the members
are more concerned. This led to strong support to
health-related agenda but also the other point is we
have been having dynamic workers association which
is Uganda nurses’ association. Uganda workers union
and other associations and union have become more
organized and serious and then we also have the
civil society organizations that have been very active.”
(KII - Kampala, Uganda)
Policy effectiveness
In this section, we are not concerned with assessing the ef-
fectiveness of specific initiatives in each country so much
as drawing a wider conclusion about the effectiveness of
the policy trajectory in these post-conflict settings – the
extent to which it matched to needs, addressed them and
was informed by learning processes (i.e., an understanding
of what worked or what did not, why and how to address
critical blockages).
In Uganda, health policies like the Health Sector Stra-
tegic Plans (HSSPs I,II and III), the PRDP 2007 and
2010, which is the overarching policy framework for re-
covery, and the five-year donor funded implementation
programmes had either mid-term or annual evaluations
embedded [11]. These policies had an impact on the
general working conditions of health workers but were
mainly focused on health worker numbers as the main
metric of success. Most other policy initiatives such as
the hard to reach allowance (2010) and bursary scheme
(2009) have not been evaluated. In general, KIIs indi-
cated that there are pockets of improvements as a result
of policies, but these are still far from the planned tar-
gets, both at national level and those desired by health
workers in conflict-affected areas [25]. Hence, the HRH
challenges identified in the early post-conflict period
have persisted. The effectiveness of the policies has been
hindered by limited funding, limited capacity of some
actors, poor coordination, and lack of support and
supervision, among other factors [11].
In Sierra Leone, the series of reforms that accompanied
the launch of the FHCI have been assessed as relatively
successful in terms of addressing the most pressing HRH
issues [30]. These reforms contributed substantially to the
rationalization and improvement of the incentive package
available for health workers. However, it is interesting to
note that most of the respondents, especially those work-
ing at central level, focused their narratives almost ex-
clusively on the design and the planning phase of the
reforms. Few of them discussed the implementation phase
and the challenges it brought, or were aware of any evalu-
ations of the impact of those reforms. This suggests that
attention was given to the design of the policies and far
less focus was applied to the implementation and how
policies were translated into practice. For example, there
was very little awareness at central level about the PBF
and remote allowance schemes – both critical to health
worker motivation and facing considerable implemen-
tation challenges. Additionally, the few evaluations of
policies were externally commissioned (for example, the
FHCI one [31]).
During the launch of the FHCI, preferences were also
given to one-off exercises, e.g. the mobile recruitment
programme, or shorter-term solutions, rather than an
organic and coherent reform package (such as address-
ing pre-service training) [38].
“On the package for reward, incentives […] it was
a bit lost, not looking at the international evidence.
[…]. I don’t know how you would say that, but a kind
of bricolage” (KII – donor, Sierra Leone).
Despite the increase in the alignment of partners with
ministerial policies at least at design stage, the lack of
coordination became problematic after the launch of the
FHCI, when the political pressure for rapid reforms was
reduced, leaving room for fragmented policy-making
and implementation. Disconnections appeared between
MoH and donors, among donors, and even between the
different departments of the MoH and at different levels
of the administrative hierarchy (central and district-
level). The result was a series of policies that were not
completely coherent and a largely ineffective implemen-
tation of these policies. Additionally, the dependence on
donor funding and technical assistance has so far led to
a cyclical pattern – windows of opportunity (generated
by crises or political leadership, backed by external sup-
port) which bring funding and focus, followed by fallow
periods of stagnation. This points to underlying institu-
tional weaknesses as well as domestic financing and cap-
acity constraints [36].
In Zimbabwe, policy developments like the creation
of the Health Service Board to implement initiatives
that addressed health worker needs were ultimately
not able to provide an acceptable package across all of
the sub-sectors and there was little impact on recruit-
ment and retention [24]. In the absence of higher level
political will and financing, shifting institutions cannot
address the fundamental blockages, even though the
understanding of the problem by all major stake-
holders was clear. The only initiatives which have
shown palpable results have been coordinated by do-
nors, such as the introduction of the harmonised re-
tention scheme in 2009, which led to improved
recruitment of nurses, doctors and environmental
health professionals [27].
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In Cambodia, the number of health workers employed
within the MoH system has significantly increased over
time, especially midwives posted in rural areas, though
challenges still remain to reach planned numbers of
other key health personnel and the health information
system for health staff is not fully reliable [39]. Little
progress has been made in addressing the maldistribu-
tion of health workers between urban and rural areas or
in improving working and living conditions with appro-
priate incentives to attract and retain well-trained health
workers in underserved areas of the country. KII also
expressed concerns about the clinical competency of
new midwives and nurses placed in rural areas, given
the limited capacity and resources of the accrediting
body, and the lack of systematic in-service training for
health staff in rural areas. The recentralisation of recruit-
ment in 2002 was intended to address quality concerns
but appears to have exacerbated the difficulty of retain-
ing staff in remote areas. The MoH was reported to
achieve only 50 % of its annual personnel recruitment
plans in some years, leading to the hiring of local staff
on temporary contracts to fill gaps [17].
The policy process has demonstrated a growing confi-
dence on the part of the MoH and a growing harmonisa-
tion amongst donors, as well as a willingness to learn
from evidence while meeting the needs of the moment,
which has led to higher priority being given to different
policy objectives at each stage. Some underlying issues
remain unresolved, however, including a remuneration
package which is not adequate for health staff, and in
particular for those in rural areas without substantial
dual practice opportunities, and which fails to incentise
public service adequately. In addition, the financial in-
centive schemes are complex and time-consuming to ad-
minister at the local level [17].
Discussion
Our findings on the HRH challenges faced in these four
setting are consistent with one another and with the
wider literature [5, 40, 41]. As a result of conflict and
crisis, the number of health workers diminishes because
of death and migration and additionally health workers
are likely to move to the more secure or economically
stable areas, therefore increasing the unbalanced
distribution within the country. The skills and quality
of health workers worsen, because of the lack of
in-service training and supportive supervision, but also
because of the expansion of below-standard training
institutions. Their productivity also decreases because
of absenteeism, poor working conditions, unavailability
of drugs and equipment, low salaries and demotivation.
Often, given the weaknesses or absence of regulation
and control, health workers put in place a series of fi-
nancial coping strategies which further weaken their
performance and the health system, including dual
practice, both in the health sector (private practice or
work for NGOs and aid agencies) and outside [40].
The main differences between challenges and re-
sponses in these four settings were driven by the length
and nature of the conflict or crisis, whether it was re-
solved effectively or lingered, and how long its aftermath
lasted. In Uganda, conflict was long but only affected
one part of the country, and is now resolved, at least for
the moment. In Sierra Leone, the conflict was total but re-
solved with international assistance, although the country
faces on-going fragility made worse by the consequences
of the Ebola outbreak. Zimbabwe remains in a state of
chronic political and economic crisis. Cambodia faced
total collapse and a prolonged period of partial peace, but
is now stabilised and moving beyond ‘post-conflict’, at least
in the eyes of most research participants.
Our findings suggest that there is no formula for
whether or when a ‘window of opportunity’ will arise
which allows health systems to be reset or to break free
from path dependencies defined by the choices made for
the previous system. In Sierra Leone, there was a mo-
ment of reform in 2009–10 with the FHCI, but this was
eight years post-conflict and related more to a constella-
tion of political will and coordinated donor support than
the earlier crisis. The current post-Ebola transition ap-
pears to be another moment of opportunity for the
country due to the influx of funds, development partners
and NGOs. However, in the opportunity is also a risk of
loss of coordination as the capacity to manage is often
lowest at these crisis moments.
There is no evidence of a moment of seismic change
in human resources for health policies in the other three
settings, where path dependencies are more evident. In
Cambodia, the early choice of contracting out service
delivery has created a legacy of long-term experimenta-
tion and fragmentation of HRH management and remu-
neration approaches, which the government is now
looking to harmonise. In Uganda, national policies and
policy processes have been extended to the north, with
limited concessions to its different post-conflict needs.
In Zimbabwe, political and economic stasis has pre-
vented known HRH challenges from being resolved,
except by stop-gap external programmes. This pattern
may in part relate to the nature of the post-conflict or
crisis political settlement: in Zimbabwe and Uganda, the
post-crisis governments were a direct continuation of
the past, and thus presumably less inclined to undertake
drastic reform. The pattern may be different in other
countries, like Mozambique, where ‘post-conflict’ came
with a new regime.
The important role of development partners and
NGOs in post-conflict settings comes as no surprise, but
it is interesting to see how their role changes across
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phases of the post-conflict period, with some roles grow-
ing (e.g. funding) while others (e.g. technical support)
may tail off as the MoH capacity and confidence grows.
The shift from donor dependence is clearly not linear
and the timeframes can be longer than suggested by pre-
vious literature [42]. The role of the MoH emerges as
weaker than expected, even though policy-making pro-
cesses are generally centralised in all the settings consid-
ered. This fits with some earlier studies which suggest
that the Ministry of Health is often a low-status ministry
in fragile states. It tends to be relatively weak politically,
institutionally and financially, with insufficient authority
for wider state-building [43]. Moreover, health seems to
be more a pre-occupation of the international commu-
nity than of governments in fragile states. Others high-
light unstable “mosaic” policy-making as the prevailing
feature, with alliances of actors converging on specific
policy issues possessing special appeal at a given point in
time, to dissolve quickly as their attention is captured by
other concerns [5].
We have examined policies specifically related to HRH
issues, which may of course not be typical of all health
or other sectoral processes. However, we believe that
they are of interest in their own right for a number of
reasons. Firstly, HRH is the biggest expenditure item in
the health sector and so not just a key input to service
delivery but also one of the most important areas for ef-
ficiency. Secondly, as HRH offers opportunities for
employment and patronage, it is high profile and polit-
ical. For this reason it is often more closely guarded
from external intervention, though as seen in Zimbabwe,
donor support as a last resort can be accepted. Third, it
is a complex health system pillar because of the import-
ant role of human agency, such that HRH policies have
to be sophisticated and adaptive. Finally, HRH has
implications for other sectors as it influences and is
influenced by public sector pay policies.
The features of HRH may explain in part why there
seems to be a lot of stickiness in addressing challenges
in these settings. Problems are well understood in all
four cases but core issues – such as adequate pay, effect-
ive distribution and HRH management – are to a greater
or lesser degree unresolved. These problems are not
confined to post-conflict settings, but underlying chal-
lenges to addressing them – including fiscal space, polit-
ical consensus, willingness to pursue public objectives
over private, and personal and institutional capacity to
manage technical solutions – are liable to be even more
acute in these settings.
Conclusions
We used mixed research methods to investigate patterns
of HRH policy making in four post-conflict and post-
crisis settings. HRH was selected as the most expensive,
complex and critical health system pillar, and one with
more political ramifications. We found that HRH chal-
lenges were widely shared across the four cases in the
post-conflict period but that the policy trajectories were
different – driven by the nature of the conflicts but also
the wider context. Windows of opportunity for change
and reform can occur but are by no means guaranteed
by a crisis – rather they depend on a constellation of
leadership, financing, and capacity. Recognition of
urgency is certainly a facilitator but not sufficient alone.
Post-conflict environments face particularly severe
challenges to evidence-based policy making and policy
implementation, which also constrain their ability to ef-
fectively use the windows which are presented.
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